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21, 22

JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether there was legally sufficient evidence in

the record to show that plaintiff had failed in its duty as
landlord to supply heating and air conditioning to defendant' s
store.

Plaintiff was given summary judgment on this issue.

That being the case, the Court must view the facts in a light
most favorable to defendant, to determine whether those facts
justify entry of judgment for plaintiff as a matter of law,
giving no deference to the trial court' s conclusions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether the parol evidence rule in Utah bars

claims for fraudulent inducement.

This was a conclusion of law

by the trial that is to be reviewed for correctness. State v.
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd. , 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
3.

Whether the implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing can be read to prohibit a landlord from opening a
competing business in the leased premises.

Same standard of

review as 2 above.
4.

Whether plaintiff as landlord had a duty to act

reasonably so as to protect the business of its tenants from

-1161X10157

interference and disturbance during remodeling.

Same standard

of review as 2 above.
5.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees for time spent certifying and
appealing from the first Order and Judgment. Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980).
6.

Whether the record supports a finding by the trial

court of a knowing, voluntary and intentional waiver by defendant of her right to trial by jury. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.
458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action represents a dispute between landlord and
tenant.

TS1 Partnership (" TS1" ) is the landlord.

(R. 3, 1f 4)

It is the owner of Trolley Square in Salt Lake City. (R. 3, U 3)
TS1 rented space in Trolley Square to Penny Allred ("Allred")
who operated a shop in the mall known as "It's About Time." (R.
3, 11 4)

Allred was in the business of selling clocks, watches

and time-pieces at retail. (R. 12, 1f n)
TS1 filed the action in the court below seeking rent
for the period of time that Allred held over as tenant. (R. 3,
1111 8-9)

Allred agreed that she owed rent as a hold-over tenant.

(R. 236, 11 3)

However, included in the rent was a charge for

heating and air conditioning, TS1' s " HVAC Plant Charge." (R. 12,
11 1; R. 32, § 7. 4)

Allred categorically denied receiving the

-2161X10157

heating and air conditioning services for which the HVAC Plant
Charge was made. (R. 237, UU 4-7)
TSl moved for summary judgment on its complaint. (R.
157)

Allred admitted owing $6,665.98 in back rent and consented

to entry of judgment for that amount. (R. 2 3 6, 11 3)

However,

Allred challenged the remaining $6,634. 34 sought by TSl because
$6,054. 29 represented HVAC Plant Charges made by TSl over the
life of the lease and the remaining $580.05 represented various
duplicate and unspecified charges (which have since been dropped
by TSl). (R. 237, UU 4-9)
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
Allred filed an Affidavit addressing each of the disputed
charges. (R. 23 6)

In paragraph 7, she stated that the "bay"

where her store was located had never been connected to TS1; s
central heating and air conditioning system. (R. 237)

Thus,

even though she had installed (at her own expense) the local
delivery system required by the lease agreement (R. 71, U 3),
she did not get heating and air conditioning because it never
reached her bay.
TSl did not controvert any of these material facts.
(RR. 242-43)

It simply asked the Court to conclude, as a matter

of law, that since Allred had the duty to install an HVAC
delivery system in her store, TSl was relieved of any obligation
concerning heating and air conditioning.

-3161X10157.

(R. 243, "Since it was

the Defendant's contractual duty to provide her own HVAC
distribution system, no defect in said system is chargeable to
Plaintiff. " )
On the basis of this argument, the trial court granted
summary judgment for all of the disputed HVAC charges. (R. 2 70)
An Order and Judgment was entered on November 2, 1990 for
$12,720.27, together with attorneys' fees of $1,560.00. (R. 271)
Copies of the Minute Entry and Order and Judgment are reproduced
at Addendum A hereto.
This left Allred with her Counterclaim.

(R. 70)

In

her First Claim for Relief, she alleged that she had been
induced to enter into the lease agreement on the basis of
fraudulent representations, such as:

TS1 was going to spend

$800, 000 advertising the grand re-opening of Trolley Square and
that as part of the remodeling efforts, parking would be
increased.

(RR. 70-71)

As Second and Third Claims for Relief,

Allred alleged that TS1 opened a competing business at Trolley
Square in violation of an implied covenant in the lease
agreement (R. 72) and that TS1 failed to conduct the remodeling
efforts in her bay in a reasonable manner, causing interference
and disturbance to her business. (R. 73)
TS1 moved for summary judgment on all of Allred' s
counterclaims. (R. 358)

TS1 argued that Allred's fraudulent

["'inducement claim was barred by the parol evidence rule. (RR.
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368-71)

On the competition claim, TS1 contended there was

nothing in the lease agreement to prevent it from opening a
business that competed with Allred7s at Trolley Square. (R. 372)
As for the business interference claim, TS1 argued it had no
duty under the lease agreement to protect Allred7 s business
during remodeling. (RR. 3 72-74)
TS1 did not attempt to controvert any of the factual
allegations in Allred7 s Counterclaim.

(RR. 360-64) 1

Rather,

its second summary judgment motion, just like the first, was
grounded entirely on conclusions of law. (R. 365, "Introduction" )
Once again, the trial court granted TS17 s motion for
summary judgment. (R. 520)

This was done without a hearing,

though Allred requested one pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration.

(R. 4 94)

An Order and Judgment was entered on

October 27, 1992, dismissing Allred7 s Counterclaim with
prejudice. (R. 614)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were also signed at TS17s request (R. 607), though Allred

The only factual statement made by TS1 in the summary
judgment motion was that Allred signed the lease agreement (R.
360, 11 1), a fact that Allred has never denied. (R. 69, 11 4) All
of the remaining statements were merely restatements and
characterizations of provisions in the lease agreement or
allegations in Allred7 s Counterclaim.
-5161X10157

objected to their form. (R. 524 ) 2

Copies of the Minute Entry,

Order and Judgment, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
are reproduced at Addendum B hereto.
As part of this second Order and Judgment, the trial
court awarded TSl attorneys' fees of $8,760.00. (R. 615, 11 5)
This was in addition to the $1,560. 00 previously awarded TSl as
attorneys' fees in the first Order and Judgment. (R. 272, 11 3)
Allred objected to the amount of the request (R. 528) because
most of the fees ($4,740. 00) were for pursuing certification of
the first Order and Judgment and then appeal from that Order.
(RR. 593-601, charges for November 23, 1990 to February 12,
1992) 3
Certification was done at TSl's instance (R. 296), so
that it could execute on the first Order and Judgment. (R. 276)
This left Allred no choice but to appeal (R. 315) in order to
preserve her objection to the errors made by the trial court.
Allred had previously warned the trial court that certification

2

None of the conclusions necessarily made by the trial court
are reflected in the Conclusions of Law, while most of the
"findings" in the Findings of Fact were truly conclusions of law.
3

Allred also objected (RR. 529-30) to an award of $580.00 for
time spent by TSl trying to execute on the supersedeas bond posted
by Allred (RR. 601-02, charges for February 20 to April 14, 1992)
and still another charge of $330.00 for time spent arranging a
scheduling conference with the trial court. (RR. 602-03, charges
for April 20-22, May 11, 13, 22, June 1 and 2, 1992)
Allred
agreed to a charge of $3,110.00 (R. 530), which seemed more in
line with the $1, 560. 00 previously awarded on the grant of the
first summary judgment motion. (R. 270)
-6161X10157.

was improper because of the pendency of her counterclaim. (RR.
298-300)

Copies of both purported certifications are reproduced

at Addendum C hereto. (See n. 5, infra)
Just as she predicted, the Court of Appeals (Case No.
910189-CA) questioned the jurisdiction of the appeal (in a
Notice of Sua Sponte Consideration for Summary Disposition,
December 18, 1991).
been filed.

Unfortunately, this was after briefs had

In a Memorandum Decision dated February 7, 1992 (R.

328), the Court of Appeals ruled per curiam that given the
pendency of the counterclaim there was no final judgment from
which to appeal. (R. 329)

It therefore dismissed the appeal for

lack of appellate jurisdiction, and remitted the case to the
trial court. (R. 331)
There is one final issue the Court must consider, and
it involves the first ruling made by the trial court in this
case.

Allred timely demanded trial by jury of all issues in

this action. (R. 73)

TS1 moved to strike the jury trial demand

(R. 139) because there was a jury trial waiver buried on the
forty-eighth page of the small print of the lease agreement. (R.
133)

The motion to strike was opposed with an affidavit by

Allred (R. 145) stating that she was not informed of the
existence of the jury trial waiver (H 6); the lease agreement
was presented to her on a "take it or leave it" basis (H 5); and
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she was an unsophisticated business person who had never before
signed anything as complex as the lease agreement (HU 2-4).
TS1 rested on the jury trial waiver in the lease
agreement. (RR. 148-49)

In an Order dated August 30, 1990, the

trial court granted the motion to strike. (R. 155)

Copies of

the Minute Entry and Order are reproduced at Addendum D hereto.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary

judgment in TS1' s favor on the $6,054.29 HVAC Plant Charge.
There was legally sufficient evidence in the record to show that
TS1 had failed to supply heating and air conditioning to
Allred' s bay.

It is beyond question that TS1 had the legal duty

to supply heating and air conditioning to Allred' s bay.

Summary

judgment on the HVAC Plant Charge should have been denied.
2.

The trial court erred when it ruled that the parol

evidence rule in Utah bars claims for fraudulent inducement.

It

also erred when it ruled that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing does not require a landlord to refrain from
opening a competing business in the leased premises.

The trial

court erred when it ruled as a matter of law that TS1 had no
duty to protect Allred' s business during remodeling.
3.
attorneys7

The trial court abused its discretion by awarding

fees for time spent pursuing the fruitless certifi-

cation and appeal instigated by TS1.
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4.

The record does not support a finding by the trial

court that Allred made a knowing, voluntary or intentional
waiver of her right to trial by jury.

The trial court struck

Allred' s jury demand in the face of uncontroverted evidence that
Allred did not know about the waiver and the waiver itself was
buried inconspicuously on the forty-eighth page of the lease
agreement.
ARGUMENTS
I.

AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER
TSl SUPPLIED HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING TO ALLRED.

In a good faith effort to streamline these proceedings, Allred conceded an obligation to pay rent for the period
of time that she held over as tenant.

However, she plainly

disputed any liability to TSl for HVAC Plant Charges, based on
the failure by TSl to supply any heating or air conditioning to
the "bay" in which her store was located.
For its part, TSl chose not to challenge these
assertions.

Rather, it argued that it had no legal obligation

to supply heating and air conditioning to Allred.

To be sure,

there is some ambiguity in the language of the lease agreement
as to the extent and precise nature of each party7 s obligation,
but TSl is wrong when it says it had no obligation to supply
heating and air conditioning.

Unfortunately, TSl succeeded in
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getting the trial court to read an affirmative obligation to
supply heating and air conditioning out of the lease agreement.
The relevant portions of the lease agreement regarding
heating and air conditioning are found in point (1) of the
Summary of Fundamental Lease Provisions (R. 171), wherein Allred
is obligated to pay $3. 22 per square foot for HVAC Equipment,
and at point 5 of Schedule "B, " titled "HVAC." (R. 250)

This

latter section provides in pertinent part as follows:
Central System - Landlord will provide and
maintain a central plant and a system of
chilled air to the premises installed at a
point determined by the Landlord. Tenant
agrees to adapt to Landlord' s central system
and provide a complete air distribution
system connected to the air volume control
unit. The air volume control unit and
thermostat will be furnished and installed
by the Landlord, at Tenant7 s expense and
sized to accommodate the design conditions
as defined below. . . .
(1) Central System Design - The landlord's
central plant and system of chilled air
supply will be designed to provide the
following capacities per square foot of
floor area of the Tenant' s leased premises:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Design Total Cooling
Design Air Delivery
Available Air Pressure
(Downstream of Air
Volume Control Unit)
Air Supply Temperature
summer
winter

30 BTU/Hr.SF
0. 70 CFM/SF
0. 25 inches of water
54F DB & 53. 4 FWB
57 F DB

(2) Operation - Landlord will make chilled
air available to the premises at such times
and days as the Center is normally open for
business to the public.
-10161X10157.

Under Schedule "B, " Allred has an obligation to
install certain equipment to connect to TSl' s HVAC system.
However, it is equally clear that TSl has an obligation to
provide a system from which the tenant can draw cooled and
heated air.

The Schedule even describes the air volume and

temperatures for air piped through the system.

It therefore

cannot be disputed that TSl had some obligation under the lease
agreement to provide heated and chilled air.
It may be (as TSl suggests, R. 243) that Allred failed
to properly hook into the central distribution system.

However,

it is just as possible (as Allred contends, R. 237, 11 7) that
TSl failed to pump heated and chilled air to Allred' s bay.
Either way, it is difficult to conceive of a more straightforward question of fact.

The trial court erred in concluding

that TSl had no duty to supply heating and air conditioning, and
paragraph 7 of Allred' s Affidavit was sufficient to send the
issue of whether TSl had breached that duty to the trier of
fact.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN DISMISSING ALLRED' S
COUNTERCLAIM.
A.

First Claim for Relief

TSl' s motion for summary judgment on the First Claim
for Relief in Allred' s Counterclaim was based entirely on the
terms of the lease agreement.

It was also based on the

-11161X10157.

erroneous proposition that the parol evidence rule in Utah does
not recognize an exception for claims of fraud in the
inducement.
What is strange, TS1 cited a case that contradicted
the very position it took in the court below. Rainford v.
Rvtting. 451 P. 2d 769, 770-71 (Utah 1969).

Allred could have

stopped there, but offered what she considered to be even
stronger Utah authority on the subject.
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985) has
the following statement:
The parol evidence rule. . . has a very narrow
application. Simply stated, the rule
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements,
or representations offered for the purpose
of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract. . . . Parol evidence is
admissible to prove that a party was induced
into a contract by fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an integrated
contract. "
707 P.2d at 665-66 (emphasis added).
TS1 relied on an opinion from the Arizona Court of
Appeals to the effect that parol evidence is inadmissible to
support a claim of fraudulent inducement that contradicts or
varies the express terms of a written contract. Spudnuts v.
Lane, 641 P. 2d 915 (Ariz. App. 1982).
Utah.
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That is not the law in

Consider Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607
P. 2d 798 (Utah 1980).
promissory notes.

This was an action on a series of

The signers of the notes defended on the

basis of a claim of fraudulent inducement.

Plaintiff contended

that a fraudulent inducement defense could not be set up because
"defendants had no right to rely on any representations made
which were inconsistent with the terms of the notes. " 607 P. 2d
at 800.
The case was tried to a jury.

The jury returned a

special verdict finding that defendants had been fraudulently
induced to enter into the promissory notes.
denied motions for directed verdict.

The trial court

The Supreme Court upheld

both the jury verdict and the trial court's denial of the
motions for directed verdict, necessarily concluding that
defendants' fraudulent inducement claims were not barred as a
matter of law.
Of course, this contention by TS1 begs an essential
question, that is, whether Allred made any claim that contradicts or varies the express provisions of the lease agreement.
TS1 never even tried to demonstrate that this was the case.
The representations alleged by Allred appear in
paragraph 1 of the First Claim for Relief. (R. 70)

Allred

specifically alleged that prior to signing the lease agreement,
four people representing Trolley Square (identified by name)
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made the following representations for the purpose of inducing
her execution of the lease agreement:
(a)

That TS1 intended to make Trolley
Square the "showplace" of Salt
Lake City;

(b)

That TS1 intended to expend
approximately $800,000 to
advertise the "grand re-opening"
of Trolley Square after
remodeling;

(c)

That Trolley Square attracted
70,000 visitors weekly and was
Utah7 s second favorite tourist
attraction;

(d)

That parking at Trolley Square
would be increased; and

(e)

That the "grand re-opening" of
Trolley Square would take place by
a date certain, prior to August,
1988.

Allred went on to allege that she was told by those
same Trolley Square representatives that in order to take
advantage of the benefits of the newly remodeled Trolley Square,
and as a precondition to the execution of the lease agreement,
she would have to remodel her tenant' s space at her expense. (R.
71, H 2)
It is clear that none of the claimed fraudulent
representations violates an express provision of the lease
agreement.

The first is not covered by any provision in the

lease agreement.

The second is covered by Section 9. 1. (R. 37)
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However, there is nothing in that Section specifying the amount
of advertising dollars to be spent by TSl.

The third is not

covered by any provision in the lease agreement.

The fourth is

covered by Section 1.4 (R. 15), but that Section says only that
TSl may increase parking, not that it will or that it will not.
The fifth is covered by Section 2.5(a) (R. 18), and it is
perfectly consistent with that Section.

Section 2.5(a) says

only that the "Grand Opening Date" is to be "established by
Landlord," which is the very thing Allred claims TSl did.

As

for the sixth, it is also perfectly consistent with Schedule "B"
to the lease agreement, governing improvements by landlord and
tenant. (R. 459)
Thus, even under the restrictive interpretation of the
parol evidence rule urged upon the Court by TSl, the First Claim
for Relief in Allred' s Counterclaim should have stood.
B.

Second Claim for Relief

Under the lease agreement, Allred was prohibited from
making any use of the premises, other than that set forth in the
Summary of Fundamental Lease Provisions. (R. 12, 11 (n) )

The

lease agreement also penalized Allred if she were to operate a
similar or competing business within five miles of Trolley
Square. (R. 28, U (d) )
All that Allred asked is that TSl not open a business
that competed with hers in Trolley Square.
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That is precisely

what Allred claims TSl did.

In her Second Claim for Relief,

Allred alleged that starting in September, 1989, TSl opened a
business called "San Francisco Music Box" as a tenant in Trolley
Square. (R. 72, H 7)

This new business competed directly with

two of the permitted use of Allred7 s leased premises:

retail

sales of "music boxes, musical figurines." (R. 12, H (n))

What

is worse, TSl opened San Francisco Music Box free of rent in an
attempt to induce a long-term lease agreement. (R. 71, 1[ 7)
Allred estimated that she lost $15,000 in sales during the
period of time that San Francisco Music Box was in the mall. (R.
72, 1f 8)
TSl argued there was nothing in the lease agreement
preventing it from opening a business that competed with one of
its existing tenants. (R. 372, 11 B)
point.

TST s argument misses the

Allred contends that under the circumstances, it is fair

to imply a duty on the part of TSl that corresponds with the
duty of Allred, not to open a competing business within the
marketing zone of Allred7 s business at Trolley Square.

Thus,

Allred7 s argument is premised on the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
Allred agrees that the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing cannot be used to "establish new, independent
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Heslop v. Bank
of Utah, 839 P. 2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992).
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Rather, it is "read

into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or
promises of the contract. ..." Peterson v. Browning, 832 P. 2d
1280,

1284 (Utah 1992).

The duty equates with a promise by each

party that it "will not intentionally or purposely do anything
that will destroy or injure the other party' s right to receive
the fruits of the contract. " St. Benedict' s Development Company
v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P. 2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991).

The

duty says that "a party's actions must be consistent with the
agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the
other party." 811 P. 2d at 200.
This cannot be done by examination of the express
contract terms alone. St. Benedict' s Development Company v. St.
Benedict' s Hospital, 811 P. 2d at 200.

"The purpose, intentions,

and expectations of the parties should be determined by
considering the contract language and the course of dealings
between and conduct of the parties." rd. (emphasis in original).
Allred expressly covenanted to sell only certain items
at Trolley Square and also to pay heavily for the right to open
a competing business within five miles of Trolley Square.

These

provisions were clearly intended to protect TS1' s existing
tenants at Trolley Square and also to protect TS1's "percentage
rent" (six percent of Allred' s gross sales in excess of $425,000
per rental year).

(R. 12, H (i))

Query whether these same

contractual provisions do not reflect an agreed common purpose
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in the lease agreement that Allred maximize sales to the mutual
advantage of both parties without interfering with the business
of TS1' s other tenants at Trolley Square.

Since she was being

asked to sell only certain items, was it unreasonable for her to
expect that similar restrictions would be placed on other
tenants?

Since she was being asked to maximize sales in Trolley

Square, was it unreasonable for her to expect that TS1 would
refrain from assisting a competing tenant by providing rental
space in Trolley Square free of charge?
We ask the Court to consider in greater detail the
case of St. Benedict7 s Development Company v. St. Benedict7 s
Hospital. supra.

The Hospital leased ground that it owned to

the Development Company for the purpose of constructing a
professional office building.

The lease agreement placed

restrictions on the kinds of tenants who could sublease space
from the Development Company.4

Later, the parties agreed to

construct a second professional office building.

In this

agreement, the Hospital promised to help the Development Company
obtain tenants for the new office space.

Years later, the

Hospital announced it was going to construct a third professional office building, this time with another developer.

The

Office space was unqualifiedly restricted to medical
r practitioners.
Then, so far as practicable, office space was
reserved for medical practitioners with privileges at the
Hospital.
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Development Company sued, claiming among other things that the
Hospital had violated the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
There was nothing in the agreements between the
parties prohibiting the Hospital from going to a different
developer to build new professional office space near the
Hospital. 811 P.2d at 198.

However, the Court accepted for

purposes of the appeal, the Development Company' s allegation
that
the operation of the [hospital and the
professional building] would be conducted
for the mutual economic advantage and
benefit of the parties, and that neither
party would conduct itself in such a way as
to cause diminution of patients of the
hospital or tenants of the professional
building, or economic loss to the other.
Id. at 196.
Based on this, the Court determined that "the
hospital's encouragement of a competing office building suggests
that there may have been a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
The trial court' s dismissal of the claim was reversed, id.
This case is at the same stage of development.
Allred' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was dismissed as a matter of law, the trial
court concluding that there was no implied covenant preventing
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TS1 from opening a competing tenant.

For its part, TS1 did not

challenge the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the
Counterclaim.

Rather, it rested on the express terms of the

lease agreement, arguing that there was no provision in the
lease agreement prohibiting it from leasing space to a
competitor of one of its existing tenants at Trolley Square.
The trial court necessarily concluded (in the face of Allred' s
arguments to the contrary, RR. 491-92) that Allred had failed to
state a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, or that such a duty did not inhere in lease agreements.

Either way, the trial court erred.
C.

Third Claim for Relief

Allred' s Third Claim for Relief was for breach of the
express terms of the lease agreement.

Section 1. 4 of the lease

agreement provides that the "Landlord shall use its reasonable
efforts to assure that [building operations] will cause as
little inconvenience, annoyance and disturbance to Tenant as
possible consistent with accepted construction practice in the
vicinity and to assure that such work shall be expeditiously
completed."

(R. 16)

In paragraph 9 of her Counterclaim, Allred

alleged that the "vast remodeling of Trolley Square" undertaken
by TS1 in 1986 and 1987, subjected Allred to "noise, blocked
hallways, and broken and dirtied inventory. ..."
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Inexplicably, the trial court dismissed this Third
Claim for Relief, despite the existence of express contractual
language supplying the duty that Allred claimed was breached,
all of which was brought to the trial court7 s attention. (R.
493-94)

TSl did not refute the allegations of Allred's

Counterclaim.

It simply alleged that there was no obligation in

the lease agreement to protect Allred from its remodeling
efforts. (R. 515)

Once again, the trial court was in error.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS'
FEES FOR THE CERTIFICATION AND
APPEAL INSTIGATED BY TSl.
First thing after entry of the November 2, 1990 Order
and Judgment, TSl started collection efforts. (R. 276)

This was

despite the fact that the Order and Judgment was not final and
had not been certified pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Addendum A hereto)
execution. (R. 283)
certification.

Allred moved to stay

TSl's response was to seek Rule 54(b)

(R. 296)

Allred argued that the pendency of her

Counterclaim made certification ineffective. (RR. 298-300)

The

trial court disregarded this warning and proceeded to certify
the first Order and Judgment as final and appealable. (Addendum
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C hereto) 5

Just as expected, the Court of Appeals dismissed

the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (R. 329)
This is now an issue because the trial court awarded
$4, 740. 00 in attorneys' fees for time spent by TS1 pursuing
certification of the first Order and Judgment and the appeal
therefrom.

(RR. 593-601, charges for November 23, 1990 to

February 12, 1992)

Allred objected to the request because the

certification and appeal turned out to be a complete waste of
time, all of which was occasioned by TS1 and its headlong rush
to execution. (RR. 528-29)

The fault lies with TS1, not Allred.

No matter the outcome of this appeal, TS1 should pay its own
attorneys' fees for the previous appeal.
Allred also objects to two other attorneys' fees
awards.

TS1 received $580. 00 for time spent pursuing execution

of the supersedeas bond posted by Allred.

TS1 was supposed to

make a motion (with notice to Allred) to get the bond released.
(R. 322)

TS1 ignored this requirement and tried to garnish the

bond. (R. 326)
efforts.

When the trial court resisted, TS1 abandoned its

The trial court ultimately entered an "Order

Continuing Stay of Execution Upon Appeal" (R. 627) continuing

Actually, the first certification did not stick. The trial
court neglected to make the "express determination" required by
Rule 54(b). (Addendum C hereto, R. 311) Not surprisingly, the
Court of Appeals issued a Notice of Sua Sponte Consideration for
Summary Disposition (April 12, 1991).
TS1 tried to fix the
certification in an Amended Order of April 22, 1991. (Addendum C
hereto, R. 320)
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the stay without an increase in the bond.

Allred should not

have to pay for TS1' s wrongful and completely unsuccessful
attempts at garnishing the supersedeas bond.
Finally, Allred objects to an award of $330.00 for
time spent arranging a scheduling conference with the trial
court.

Allred did not object to the $50.00 charged for

attendance at the conference.

Allred fails to see how it could

have possibly required three and a half hours of lawyer time to
arrange a scheduling conference.

The charge is clearly

excessive and unreasonable.
Should she lose this appeal, Allred has agreed to an
attorneys' fees charge of $3,110.00 for the second summary
judgment, which seems more in line with the $1,560.00 previously
awarded on the first summary judgment.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
ALLRED' S JURY TRIAL DEMAND.

The trial court7 s ruling is not supported by findings.
Therefore, the basis for the ruling is not clear.

There are two

alternative bases on which the court could have ruled; either it
concluded that Allred is deemed to have read and understood the
waiver provision of the lease agreement, or it ruled that she
failed to allege sufficient facts to raise a material issue as
to whether she was actually aware of the waiver.
case, the trial court' s ruling was in error.
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In either

The right to trial by jury in a civil case is
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 10.

While

Utah case law is scant, federal cases dealing with the issue
have repeatedly held that for a waiver to be effective, it must
be "knowing" and "intentional." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).

In determining whether waiver

has been knowingly and intentionally made, the Court must
"indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna
Insurance Company v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct. 809,
812 (1937).
Applying this standard to the context of contractual
waiver prior to litigation, it is possible to waive the right to
trial by jury in advance, but the party seeking enforcement of
the waiver carries the burden of proving it was both voluntary
and informed. Leasing Service Corporation v. Crane, 804 F. 2d
828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986).

Issues relevant to a determination

whether a contractual waiver was intentional and informed
include the relative bargaining positions of the parties;
whether or not a given clause in the contract was actually
bargained for; and whether or not the provision is conspicuous
in the contract. K. M. C. Company, Inc. v. Irving Trust Company,
757 F. 2d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 1985)(and cases cited therein).
In the court below, TS1 argued that the waiver was
part of a contract, which Allred was deemed to have read and
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understood when she signed it.

Whatever the merits of this

argument in the context of purely private contractual rights,
the issue of jury trial waiver is one of Constitutional
proportion and implicates social policies far beyond private
commercial concerns.

Therefore, general rules governing imputed

knowledge of the contents of a contract are inapplicable and
waiver should be found only where the waiving party has intentionally agreed to the waiver on the basis of actual, not
imputed knowledge of the existence of the waiver.
Dreilina v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc. , 53 9 F.
Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1982) articulates this standard in a factual
context similar to that before the Court.

In Dreilina, the

defendants sought to strike a demand for jury trial based on a
waiver provision in a standard Peugeot Dealer contract.

The

contract ran some twenty-two pages and the jury waiver was
imbedded at page twenty.

In denying the motion, the court held

as follows:
In view of this strong presumption the
defendants have a very heavy burden of
proving that the plaintiffs knowingly,
voluntarily and intentionally agreed upon
the jury waiver provision in the 1978
Agreement. A constitutional right so
fundamental as the right to jury trial
cannot be waived unknowingly by mere
insertion of a waiver provision on the
twentieth page of a twenty-two page
standardized form contract.
Dreilina, 539 F. Supp. at 403.
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The court went on to indicate that there was no
evidence that the waiver provision was bargained for; no
evidence that it was mentioned during negotiations; and
significant evidence that the bargaining power of the parties
was so unequal as to permit little if any room for negotiation.
Allred raised the following unrefuted factual
allegations supported by Affidavit in opposition to TS1' s Motion
to Strike:

That she was a novice in the business world; that

she had never before entered into a lease agreement; that she
was not aware of the waiver of right to jury trial in the lease;
that she was told that other tenants of Trolley Square were
agreeing to the lease without changes; and that she would have
to sign the lease if she wished to retain her store.
An even cursory glance through the lease agreement
discloses the adhesive and overreaching nature of the document.
The table of contents alone covers over two pages of fine print.
The only points on which it can reasonably be stated that the
parties reached agreement appear in the "Summary of Fundamental
Lease Provisions," which comprises two pages, followed by fortysix pages of one-sided, pro-landlord legal jargon and an
additional twenty pages of terms and conditions contained in the
schedules, all for the lease of some eight hundred square feet.
The jury waiver provision is buried on page forty-eight of the
lease agreement at sub-point eighteen of Section 19. To suggest
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that this barrage of legal verbiage is a true reflection of an
actual agreement between two parties stretches even the flexible
fabric of legal fiction.

To further suggest that the jury

waiver was made knowingly and intentionally because it appeared
in this form agreement is absurd.
As noted above, in order for this Court to rule in
favor of TS1 on its Motion to Strike, it must find that Allred
knowingly and intentionally waived her right to trial by jury.
While the trial court' s decision is not supported by findings,
the only possible basis for the decision is that the waiver
appeared in the contract and the contract was signed by Allred.
However, the burden of proof on this issue lies with TS1 to
demonstrate that Allred knowingly and intentionally waived her
rights.

There is no such finding and indeed, on the record

before this Court, there is insufficient evidence to support a
finding of knowing and intentional waiver.

Therefore the trial

court either applied an incorrect legal standard or it failed to
permit the development of a factual record sufficient to support
its ruling.

In either case, the ruling is incorrect and should

be reversed with an instruction to reinstate Allred7 s demand for
trial by jury on all claims.
CONCLUSION
Allred is entitled to a trial by jury on the issue
whether TS1 breached its agreement to supply heating and air
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conditioning to Allred' s bay at Trolley Square.

Allred

successfully controverted TSl's summary judgment motion with an
affidavit setting forth a legally sufficient basis for the
conclusion that TS1 failed to connect Allred7 s bay to its
central delivery system, so that even if she correctly connected
to the central delivery system, she would not have received
chilled or heated air.

The trial court' s ruling was more likely

based on the erroneous legal proposition, forwarded by TS1, that
it had no obligation to deliver heated or chilled air to
Allred' s store.

Either way, the grant of summary judgment on

TS1' s HVAC Plant Charge was in error and should be reversed.
Allred is entitled to trial by jury on the issues
raised by her Counterclaim.

Utah law on the parol evidence rule

does not bar a claim for fraud in the inducement.

In any event,

none of Allred' s claimed misrepresentations contradict or vary
an express term of the lease agreement.

Allred has demonstrated

that Utah law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing recognizes a duty on the part of a landlord not to open
a business that competes and interferes with one of its existing
tenants.

Finally, Allred properly alleged breach of an express

provision of the lease agreement, when she alleged that TS1' s
remodeling had damaged her business.

The trial court was wrong

in granting TS1' s second summary judgment motion and should be
reversed.
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Should Allred prevail on either of these two claims,
she should be awarded her attorneys' fees on appeal.

The right

to attorneys' fees reserved by TSl to it alone (R. 51, 11 (c)) is
now reciprocal because the lease agreement was executed after
April 28, 1986. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 5.
Even if Allred fails on this appeal, the award of
attorneys' fees against her on the second summary judgment
motion should be reduced to $3,110.00.

Allred should not have

to pay for the first, fruitless appeal.

She should not have to

pay for TSl' s wrongful efforts to execute on her supersedeas
bond.

And, she should not have to pay a total of $380.00 for a

scheduling conference in the court below.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of February,
1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

iV^Ly^
^XllM^

By

;/kb-tfMk

Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Allred
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing APPELLANT' S BRIEF to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this 24th day of February, 1993, to the
following:
Arnold Richer
Richer, Swan & Overholt
311 South State, Suite 350/
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 '
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Exhibit A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP
PLAINTIFF
VS
ALLRED, PENNY

CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV
DATE 10/25/90
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. RICHER, ARNOLD
D. ATTY. DALTON, DONALD L

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501 AND THE COURT
HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES
ORDERS PLAINTIFF GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR $12,720.27 AND
ATTORNEY FEES OF $1,560 AND COSTS.
CC: ARNOLD RICHER
DONALD L DALTON

JUDGEMENT

NOV

2 1990

Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

Nb^S*

v.

\\~^)~C\O^.\0LCU^

PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

Defendant.
ooOoo

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501

(8) Judicial Counsel Rules of

Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file
herein and being fully advised in the premises and upon motion of
Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN

& OVERHOLT, P . C ,

attorneys

for

Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

granted.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the Defendant

in the amount of $12,720.27, together with interest at the contract

rate of 20% per annum from February 4, 1990 until paid in full.
3.

Plaintiff

is further awarded judgment as against the

Defendant in the sum of $89.25 representing costs and $1,560.00
representing attorney's fees incurred herein.
DATED this

day of November, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Donald L. Dalton
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed in the United States mail, first
class, postage prepaid this ^l/'tfJ^

day of October, 1990 to th?

following:
DONALD L. DALTON, Esquire
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Exhibit B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP
PLAINTIFF
VS
ALLRED, PENNY

CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV
DATE 10/14/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. COMES NOW THE
COURT AND ORDERS MOTION GRANTED.
CC: ARNOLD RICHER
DONALD L. DALTON

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 7 1992
Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN 6 OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DEPUTY

Tf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ORDER and JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Civil No. 900903454 CV

Defendant.

Judge Sawaya
ooOoo

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Judicial Counsel Rules of
Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file and
pleadings herein and being fully advised in the premises, and
having submitted its Minute Entry of October 14, 1992, and the
Court having made its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and upon motion of Arnold Richer of Richer, Swan & Overholt,
P.C, attorneys for Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

granted.
2.

Defendant's First Cause of Action of her Counterclaim,

seeking recovery for sums expended for tenant improvements, is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
3.

Defendant's Second Cause of Action of her Counterclaim,

seeking compensation for Plaintiff's breach of an alleged noncompetition agreement, is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
4.

Defendant's Third Cause of Action, seeking unspecified

compensation for business interruption, is hereby dismissed.
5.
amount

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant in the
of

$8,760.00, representing

additional

attorney's

incurred.

DATED this

2 7

/L <v/

day of

, 1992.
^

BY THE COURT:

f '
\

Jaiqe^7s.

Sawaya

Disti ^i£t Court Judge

2

fees

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

f0

day of October, 1992, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 7 1992
Arnold Richer - 2751

WLI L*I\C

Mark E.
E . Medcalf
M e d c a l f -- 5404
5404
Mark

ujUNrv

R V^ ^&A.y/v,A
ftAi/vx^.,.

R y

RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P . C .

DEWrYi

311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Civil No. 900903454 CV

Defendant.

Judge Sawaya
ooOoo

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Judicial Counsel Rules of
Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file and
pleadings herein and being fully advised in the premises and having
submitted its Minute Entry of October 14, 1992, the Court does now
make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

is an Indiana

limited

partnership

duly

authorized to do business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and at

0

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

all times material herein did business in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and elsewhere.
2.

Defendant is an individual and resident of Salt lake

County, State of Utah, who entered

into an agreement

to be

performed in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

On or about March 4, 1987 Plaintiff, as landlord, and

Defendant, doing business under the name of It's About Time, as
tenant, entered into a Lease Agreement, a copy of which is attached
to the Complaint as Exhibit "A".
4.

On or about March 11, 1988 Plaintiff and Defendant

entered into and executed an Agreement Setting Lease Term, which
further set forth the duties and obligations of the respective
parties relating to the Lease Agreement.

A copy of the Agreement

Setting Lease Term is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "BM.
5.

The

Lease

"Schedule "B" setting

Agreement

included

a

document

entitled

forth the obligations of Plaintiff and

Defendant with regard to work to be performed on or about the
premises.

A copy of Schedule "B" is attached to Plaintifffs

Memorandum of Undisputed Facts, Point and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit "B".
6.

The Lease Agreement includes an integration clause.
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Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

7.

The Lease Agreement includes provisions governing the

relative rights and duties of the parties thereto with regard to
improvements

to

the

leased

premises.

Included

among

the

obligations of the Defendant, as tenant, are the obligations set
forth in Section 2.2(b) to perform all improvements to the premises
as set forth in Schedule "B".
8.

Defendant is obligated, pursuant to the terms of the

Lease Agreement, to prepare at its own expense all plans and
specifications needed for tenant's work.
9.

Pursuant

to the terms of the Lease Agreement, the

Defendant is obligated to maintain the premises at Defendant's cost
in good condition making all repairs required thereto.
10.

The Defendant is similarly obligated to repair damage to

the leased premises.
11.

The Defendant is also obligated, pursuant to the terms of

the Lease Agreement, to make any and all alterations, renovations
and improvements to the leased premises at its own expense.
12.

Use to which the Defendant is permitted to put the leased

premises is set forth in the Lease Agreement and is limited to the
sale of clocks, watches, gifts, etc.
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Judge Sawaya

13.

The Defendant was, pursuant to the terms of the Lease

Agreement, limited to use of the leased premises for the "permitted
use" only, unless prior written consent of Plaintiff was obtained.
14.

The Defendant agreed to refrain from competing with

Plaintiff by opening any other business similar to Defendant's
business within five (5) miles of the Trolley Square Mall.
15.

The Lease Agreement does not provide the Defendant should

have any exclusive right to market any particular line of goods or
merchandise within the shopping center.
16.

The Plaintiff had not only the right but the obligation

to maintain and remodel the Trolley Square Mall and common areas
therein.
17.

Plaintiff's right and obligation to maintain common areas

is detailed at pages 26 and 27, Section 8.1(d) of the Lease
Agreement which sets forth Plaintiff's right to temporarily close
any and all portions of the common areas to redefine and improve
the common areas.
18.

Plaintiff's

rights

and

obligations

with

regard

to

maintenance of the Trolley Square Mall are further set forth at
page 30, Section 10.1 of the Lease Agreement, wherein Plaintiff
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Judge Sawaya

received the right and duty to maintain the structural integrity of
the building.
19.

The Court finds that the Lease Agreement constitutes an

integrated instrument incorporating all the rights and liabilities
of the parties.
20.

The Court finds that parol evidence is not admissible to

vary or add to the terms of the Lease Agreement.
21.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred additional

attorney's fees in the sum of $8,760.00 since September 17, 1990
when its first Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees was filed.
22.

The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay

and expressly directs that Judgment be entered forthwith.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

granted.
2.

Defendant's First Cause of Action of her Counterclaim

seeking recovery for sums expended for tenant improvements is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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3.

Defendant's Second Cause of Action of her Counterclaim,

seeking compensation for Plaintiff's breach of an alleged noncompetition agreement, is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
4.

Defendant's Third Cause of Action of her Counterclaim,

seeking unspecified compensation for business interruption, is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
5.
amount

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant in the
of

$8,760.00, representing

additional

attorney's

incurred.
DATED this

^ /

day of

Mf S^^

, 1992.

BY THE

James S. Sawaya
District Court Judge

fees

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

/7

day of October, 1992, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
V.

PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Civil No. 900903454 CV
Judge Sawaya

Defendant.
.

ooOoo

Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution and Plaintiff's Motion
for Revision of Judgment, having come before this Court pursuant
to

Rule

4-501

(8)

Judicial

Counsel

Rules

of

Judicial

Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file herein and
being fully advised in the premises, and having submitted its
Minute Entry of January 16, 1991, and upon motion of Arnold Richer
of Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C, Attorneys for Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution is hereby denied.

<;

2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Revision of Judgment is hereby

granted, and the Judgment entered herein on November 2, 1990, is
hereby certified as a final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
DATED this

j

day of January, 1991.
BY TH

Approved as to >fonn:

MUSW

Donald L. Dalton
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class, postage
prepaid to the following this o?/Sj- day of January, 1991:
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 8ALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
AMENDED ORDER
Plaintiff,
V.

PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Civil No. 900903454 CV

Defendant.

Judge Sawaya
ooOoo

Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution and Plaintiff's Motion
for Revision of Judgment, having come before this Court pursuant to
Rule 4-501 (8) Judicial Counsel Rules of Judicial Administration,
and the Court having reviewed the file herein and being fully
advised in the premises, and having submitted its Minute Entry of
January 16, 1991, and upon motion of Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN
& OVERHOLT, P.C, Attorneys for Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant1s Motion to Stay Execution is hereby denied.

2.

Based upon the specific finding of this Court that the

ruling herein wholly disposes of the claim of the Plaintiff and

that there is no just reason to delay any further proceeding herein
or an appeal herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Revision of Judgment is
hereby granted, and the Judgment entered herein on November 2, 1990
is hereby certified as a final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
DATED this ^ ^ d a y

of

/V,

Court Judge
APPROVED AS T

ORM:

Donald L. Dalxon
Attorney For Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AMENDED ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class,
postage prepaid this

/7

day of April, 1991 to the following:

Donald L. Dalton, Esquire
VAN COTT, BA6LEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Exhibit D

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP
PLAINTIFF
VS
ALLRED, PENNY

CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV
DATE 08/21/90
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. RICHER, ARNOLD
D. ATTY. DALTON, DONALD L

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL HAVING
BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501 AND THE
COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE
PREMISES ORDERS SAID MOTION BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY GRANTED.
CC: ARNOLD RICHER
DONALD L. DALTON

AUG 3 0 1990
J

Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632

x

*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 900903454 CV
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,

Judge Sawaya

Defendant.
ooOoo
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial, having
come before this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial
Counsel Rules of Judicial Administration, and the court having
reviewed the file herein and being fully advised in the premises,
and upon motion of Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C,
attorneys for Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1*

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial is

hereby granted.
2.

Defendant's Jury Trial Request is hereby stricken.

DATED this

day of August, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

JAME8\S. SAWAYA
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class, postage
prepaid to Donald L. Dalton, Esquire, Attorneys for Defendant, VAN
COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite
1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145, this ^^(tfday

of August, 1990.
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